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1. Civil liability is not the only regulatory tool in place. Command and control systems are also
in place, such as approvals (authorizations to operate, which are granted only if the firm is able to
demonstrate its ability to adequately control the level of risk). Approvals can be combined with random
in situ inspections once the firm is operating. See, e.g., Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions, 40
C.F.R. § 68 (1996).
2. A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE pt. II, ch. IX (4th ed. 1932).
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Many human activities, especially industrial processes, can cause
damage to the environment: chemicals, energy supply, even the agro-food
industry involves health risks. Because it can be difficult and/or costly for
potential injury victims to avoid these risks, public regulation has been put
in place in order to: 1) incite industries to engage in efforts to reduce the
level of accident risk; and 2) compensate the victims in case of damage.
For industrial activities, one of the main regulatory tools in place is
civil liability. 1 Civil liability responds to the two goals of public regulation:
it compels the injurers to compensate the victims in case of damage (via a
damages payment), and this threat of payment ex post provides incentives
to engage in effort ex ante to reduce the probability of an accident occurring.
However, most industrial activities require the involvement of several
decision makers, who all have different and autonomous legal entities.
When each of these decision makers has an impact on the overall level of
risk, the efficiency of civil liability can be found wanting. Indeed, the total
debt (to compensate victims) has to be shared among the different parties
who have contributed to the occurrence of the damage. However, since the
work of A.C. Pigou in The Economics of Welfare, 2 economic theory has
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3. To be precise, the agent has to take into account the marginal (expected) damage he causes:
for instance, if he expects to increase his level of activity, he has to (financially) take into account the
increase in damage resulting from the increase in activity (e.g. he has to pay a tax corresponding to the
damage caused by the increase in CO2 emissions).
4. We also could think of the controversy surrounding the use of Bisphenol A, which is suspected to be an endocrine disruptor. The suspected risks, related to exposure to endocrine disruptors, are
long-term health risks. In this case, applying civil liability could face difficulties because of the difficulty gathering sufficient evidence to prove the causal link between the exposure and the damage suffered.
A first economic analysis of the incentives provided by civil liability in cases of long-term latent hazards is provided by Al H. Ringleb & Steven N. Wiggins, Liability and Large Scale, Long-Term Hazards, 98 J. POL. & ECON. 98, 574–95 (1990). A practical example reflecting the difficulty in enforcing
civil liability in case of latent hazards is given by the Diethylstilbestrol (DES) case. See Caroline Politi,
Procès du Distilbène: deux laboratoires condamnés en appel, L’EXPRESS, Oct. 26, 2012.
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taught us that, in order to provide an agent with the incentive to optimally
control the level of “nuisance” he produces (e.g., pollution, risk of accident,
etc.), this agent must take into account the whole nuisance 3 he causes. But
when several agents contribute to a common damage, how can the debt of
liability be shared efficiently?
To illustrate, consider the case of energy. Taking the example of gas
power plants, the level of accident risk depends on the level of care provided by the operator (e.g. the frequency at which the gas pressure is controlled). In a French illustration, the French national electricity manufacturer, Électricité de France (EDF), is the decision maker. But for a given level
of care provided by the operator, the level of risk also depends on the reliability of the production process (e.g., keeping with France, the reliability of
the turbine provided by the French manufacturer Alstom). We can also use
the agro-food industry as another example. The level of health risk depends
on the level of care taken by the operator, such as the quality of the sterilization process, for example. However, for a given level of care, the level of
health risk also depends on the quality of inputs provided by suppliers, for
example the food containers (i.e. their ability not to oxidize in contact with
food). 4
In this article we seek to address the optimal way of sharing a debt in
liability for a common (and high) damage in which the different contributors have an impact on the likelihood of the damage occurring. We focus
our analysis on the question of the efficiency of the sharing, i.e. sharing liability in order to provide each decision maker with efficient incentives to
undertake sufficient efforts to optimally control the level of risk. We set
aside other important questions, such as fairness issues (e.g. a sufficient
level of compensation for the victims and fairness in the allocation of the
debt between the different contributors).
The following analysis is developed more generally in Julien Jacob
and Bruno Lovat’s article titled, Multiple Tortfeasors in High Risk Indus-
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tries: How to Share Liability?. 5 First, we present the originality of our contribution with respect to the literature on law and economics. We then present our assumptions and the main results of our analysis, and show how
our sharing rule could apply using a numerical example.
II. THE LITERATURE AND OUR CONTRIBUTION

05/10/2016 13:13:34

5. Julien Jacob & Bruno Lovat, Multiple Tortfeasors in High Risk Industries: How to Share Liability? (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée).
6. See infra section III.B.
7. We assume that each injurer benefits from limited liability; they cannot pay more than their
level of wealth/assets. As a consequence, if the amount of debt exceeds the level of wealth, a part of the
debt remains unpaid.
8. Han-Duck Lee et al., How Does Joint and Several Tort Reform Affect the Rate of Tort Filings? Evidence from the State Courts, 61 J. RISK & INS. 295, 316 (1994).
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Despite the wide range of applications, the economic literature on the
optimal apportionment of liability is relatively scarce, and mainly North
American.
In the United States, there are two main ways of sharing liability: using a joint-and-several liability rule or a non-joint liability rule. In each
case, several injurers are liable for a common damage. In each case, each
injurer has to pay a share of the common debt (this share is determined by
the judge). 6 The main difference between these two rules is the fact that liability is joint in the first case and non-joint in the second. In a case of nonjoint liability, each injurer has to pay its share of liability to the limit of its
level of assets. 7 In cases of joint and several liability, the different contributors are jointly liable: if one contributor is financially unable to pay for a
share of liability, the remaining debt has to be paid by the other (solvent)
contributors. As a consequence, joint and several liability allows the victims to sue only one contributor and to claim the entire damage from this
sole contributor. This contributor then has to sue the other contributors for
their shares of the liability. By pursuing only one (highly solvent) contributor, joint and several liability leads to a decrease in litigation costs for the
victims, who can more easily exercise their right to redress. Hence, joint
and several liability is the default apportionment rule in the United States in
cases of damage with multiple defendants. 8
However, in the 1980s, a tort reform movement developed with the
aim of restricting the application of joint and several liability to economic
damage only (e.g. loss of gross revenue). Nowadays, in the United States,
most states apply the rule of non-joint liability for non-economic damage,

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 117 Side B

05/10/2016 13:13:34

11 JACOB LOVAT FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

662

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

5/4/2016 1:19 PM

[Vol 91:2

especially environmental damage. 9 This change was introduced as a response to the Liability Insurance Crisis which affected certain “hazardous”
sectors (e.g. chemicals) in the United States during the 1980s; the application of joint and several liability, combined with the increasing use of strict
liability 10 and the difficulty of assessing (and forecasting) environmental
damage led to an unexpected increase in debts for environmental damages. 11 As a consequence, certain partners of these sectors decided to limit
their exposure. Liability insurers excluded environmental damages 12 and
banks 13 became more reluctant to grant loans.14 Nevertheless, the debate is
still open in the United States; not all states enacted such tort reform, and
some federal laws, like CERCLA, still use joint and several liability. 15
In this debate, the law and economic literature has developed comparative analyses between joint-and-several and non-joint liability, and/or has
developed normative analyses aiming to find an optimal sharing rule (as
mentioned before, we restrict our attention to the problem of providing optimal incentives to control the risk). A study of the literature on law and
economics shows that the optimal way to share liability between multiple
defendants is closely related to the characteristics of the situation to be regulated. Considering several contributors to a common damage (instead of
only one injurer) leads to a multiplicity of possible situations to regulate.
The situations can be differentiated according to three criteria: (i) the type
of actions that may be undertaken by the decision makers; (ii) the chronol-
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9. See Yiling Deng & George Zanjani, What Drives Tort Reform Legislation? Economics and
Politics of the State Decisions to Restrict Liability Torts (Ga. State Univ. Dep’t of Risk & Ins. Working
Paper, 2014); Lee et al., supra note 8, at 298.
10. Negligence (i.e. liability is subject to a deviation from a standard of due care) still remains the
default rule of liability. But for the case of environmental damages, strict liability (no need to demonstrate a deviation from a standard to establish liability) is increasingly used. See, e.g., Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2011).
11. Strict liability is also increasingly used in cases of work exposures. Ringleb & Wiggins, supra
note 4, at 574–95 (showing the underlying problems for the sectors which expose their workers to risks
during the production process and how these industries react in order to reduce their own exposure to
liability claims); see also Martin T. Katzman, Pollution Liability Insurance and Catastrophic Environmental Risk, 55 J. RISK & INS. 75 (1998).
12. See Dan R. Anderson, Development of Environmental Liability Risk Management and Insurance in the United States: Lessons and Opportunities, 2 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 1 (1998).
13. Two reasons justify the reluctance of the banking sector. First, if liability insurers do not cover certain risks, the expected liability debt for the firms is higher. As a consequence, the probability of
default increases (especially environmental damages cases, which can be considered as senior debts).
Second, some U.S. environmental laws, such as CERCLA, introduce an extension of liability to the
financial partners; if the firm is unable to pay for the liability, the remaining damages can be claimed
from the banks.
14. See Rohan Pitchford, How Liable Should a Lender be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms
and Environmental Risk, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1171 (1995).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
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16. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Joint Liability in Torts: Marginal and Inframarginal
Efficiency, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 235 (1991); see also STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAW ch. 7 (1987); Steven Shavell, Uncertainty over Causation and the Determinants of Civil Liability, 28 J. L. & ECON. 587 (1985); Robert Young et al., Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 3 REV. L. & ECON. 111 (2007) [hereinafter Young, Multiple Tortfeasors]; Robert Young et al.,
Causality and Causation in Tort Law, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 507 (2004).
17. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Sharing Damages Among Multiple Tortfeasors, 98 YALE L.J. 831 (1989).
18. Young, Multiple Tortfeasors, supra note 16.
19. Jacob & Lovat, supra note 5.
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ogy of actions; and (iii) the way in which the different actions combine to
lead to the occurrence of the damage.
In Joint Liability in Torts: Marginal and Inframarginal Efficiency,
Thomas Miceli and Kathleen Segerson distinguish two types of actions: binary actions (to engage or not engage in an activity), 16 or the choice of a
degree of effort within a continuum of possibilities (e.g., which degree of
care to exert). 17 The two types of actions do not lead to the same method of
optimally sharing a debt. In Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis,
Robert Young et al. analyze how the way in which the actions combine (to
lead to the damage) alters the optimal apportionment of liability. They distinguish actions in series from actions in parallel. 18 Actions in series need
the involvement of all contributors, simultaneously, to provoke the damage;
if one contributor does not act, the damage cannot occur. Actions in parallel are actions that can lead to the damage independently of each other;
each contributor can cause the damage alone through its own action. Our
analysis adopts the following position. 19
As indicated above, we restrict our attention to the efficiency of incentives. We are seeking to find a sharing rule that can provide optimal incentives to several decision makers who, by their actions, have the possibility
of controlling the probability of a given damage occurring.
We choose to analyze a common situation whereby a provider of
products/technologies is in a relationship with an industrial operator that
uses these technologies within its production process. Although only the
industrial operator’s activity can “directly” cause the damage, the upstream
technical provider has an impact on the probability of the damage occurring
because of its effort in the quality/reliability of the technology it provides
(irrespective of the degree of prevention adopted by the regulator). In this
sense, the technical provider can be considered an “indirect” contributor to
the damage and has to receive optimal incentives to provide a technology
of “good” quality.
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20. Miceli & Segerson, supra note 16; Young, Multiple Tortfeasors, supra note 16, at 121.
21. This means that the industrial operator is able to operate without the technology provided by
the provider. For instance, the operator owns a “basic technology,” and the technical provider offers an
alternative technology or an upgrade of the basic technology. This assumption can be removed and the
qualitative results remain the same: the operator would be only necessary, but no longer sufficient.
22. Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1986).
23. To illustrate, consider a firm with a financial capacity of $1 million. It can cause damage of
$10 million. Because of limited liability, it only has to pay $1 million in case of an accident. From this
firm’s point of view, this is as if it faced a damage of $1 million (and not $10 million). If the firm were
endowed with a higher level of wealth, it could face a higher loss in case of an accident. This would
provide incentives to make more effort to reduce the likelihood of this bad event.
24. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Apportioning Damages Among Potentially Insolvent Actors, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 617 (1990).
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Considering the classification introduced by Miceli and Segerson and
Young et al., 20 we observe that, to the best of our knowledge, this kind of
situation has not been considered before. Our aim is to regulate levels of
care (the agents are already engaged in their activities, which are supposed
to be socially desirable). But in regard to the way their actions combine, the
situation we consider is a new one: the industrial operator is both necessary
and sufficient to cause the damage. Without this operator, no damage can
occur (necessity), and its mere presence is sufficient to cause the damage,
irrespective of the presence or not of the technical provider. 21 The technical
provider (hereinafter the “innovator”) is neither necessary nor sufficient to
cause the damage; it cannot cause the damage alone, and the operator can
cause the damage without it.
Another original aspect of our work is that it takes into account both
the capacity of each agent to be financially unable to pay for damage
caused (insolvency), and the market relationship which links the operator to
the innovator. Since Steven Shavell’s, The Judgment Proof Problem, it has
been well-established in the law and economic literature that the possibility
of being insolvent can reduce the incentives to control the level of risk.
When the amount of damages exceeds the financial capacity of the firm,
the principle of limitation of liability prevents the firm from taking into account the whole damage it causes in its economic calculus.22 Hence its care
effort will be insufficient. 23 Insolvency in the case of multiple defendants is
studied by Lewis Kornhauser and Richard Revesz, but in a different
framework. In their work, the decision-makers have an impact on the magnitude of the damage (which occurs with certainty). 24 Instead, we consider
decision-makers that have the ability to reduce the probability of the damage occurring.
Our contribution is also original in that it takes into account the market relationship between the two injurers: the operator buys an input product, or a productive technology, from the innovator. The price is a conse-
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quence of bargaining between the two actors. Depending on the intensity of
competition on the research and development (“R&D”) market, bargaining
power would tilt in favor of one actor or the other. If the innovator benefits
from a monopoly position on the R&D market, it would be able to fix a
high selling price (because it is the only existing provider). Conversely, if
the innovator faces a large number of competitors on the R&D market, it
would have to moderate its selling price to conclude the transaction (otherwise, the operator could turn to other competitors). The innovator’s ability
(or inability) to determine its selling price has an impact on the incentives
to make efforts to improve the quality of the technology, and this degree of
quality has an impact on the likelihood of damage occurring. So the sharing
rule, which aims to provide all agents with optimal incentives to control the
level of risk, has to take the characteristics of the R&D market into account.
Finally, our analysis is explicitly a normative one. We do not compare
different existing rules of apportionment. We aim to define an optimal
sharing rule, irrespective of any existing rule, but by taking important legal
constraints into account, such as the limitation of liability. Our only objective is to define an optimal rule that provides each agent with optimal incentives to make optimal efforts to control the level of risk. Despite its
novelty, the sharing rule we propose is intended to be easily applied, without any drastic modification in the prevailing legal corpus.
III. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

A. Basic Assumptions

05/10/2016 13:13:34

We consider the case of two firms. The first one is an industrial operator, denoted by ܱ. The operator is engaged in an industrial activity that can
cause damage to third parties and/or the environment. The magnitude of the
potential damage is given by ܪܪ. The operator is endowed with a basic
productive technology, but it has the possibility of buying a new one from
an innovator, denoted by ܫI. This new technology is more reliable and reduces the probability of an accident occurring.
More precisely, the probability of a damage occurring is denoted
ሺݔǡ ݁ሻ which depends on a level of care, ݔ, which is adopted by the opera-
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As a first step, we introduce the basic assumptions of our analysis before highlighting the two main originalities of our contribution: the possibility for each injurer to be insolvent and the market relationship that links
them.
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tor, and an effort in R&D, ݁, which is adopted by the innovator and which
determines the degree of technical performance of the technology. The
ఋሺ௫ǡሻ
higher ݔ, the lower probability ሺݔǡ ݁ሻ:
൏ Ͳ. The same property
holds with R&D:

ఋሺ௫ǡሻ
ఋ

ఋ௫

൏ Ͳ. But the efficiency of  ݔand ݁ in reducing the

probability is decreasing:

ఋtሺ௫ǡሻ
ఋ௫t

cation satisfies these properties:

ఋtሺ௫ǡሻ
 Ͳ. The following specifiఋt
ୣ୶୮ሺିఈ௫ሻାୣ୶୮ሺିఉሻ
ሺݔǡ ݁ሻ ൌ
, with ߙ 
ఊ

 Ͳ,

05/10/2016 13:13:34

25. We assume that the two firms are sufficiently wealthy to repair the total damage ( ܪwhen
taken together): victims are fully compensated. This choice is an arbitrary one (it serves to lighten the
calculus). However, the sum of the total damages to be paid could be different from ܪ, and the qualitative results should not be affected.
26. In the United States, strict liability holds under CERCLA. Shavell illustrates the increasing
use of strict liability in the case of “abnormally dangerous” damage and in the case of “ultrahazardous”
activities. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 204–05 (2004) (citing
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Ͳǡ ߚ  Ͳ and ߛ  ʹ. We use this specification for our theoretical analysis
and to calibrate the numerical calculus we provide later. The operator is initially endowed with a technology with a degree 0 of technical performance
(݁ ൌ Ͳ), but it has the possibility of buying from the innovator a more advanced technology (݁  Ͳ). To exercise a care effort, as well as an effort in
R&D, is costly: the total cost of applying a given level of care  ݔis ܿǤ ݔ, and
the total cost of applying a given level of R&D ݁ is ݇Ǥ ݁.
Each firm is endowed with a level of wealth, ܹை and ܹூ , respectively
for the operator and the innovator, from which the damages will be financed in case of accident. We suppose that entering in activity allows a
firm perceiving a revenue ܴ , ݅ ൌ ܫǡ ܱ, from which it can finance its R&D
activities (firm )ܫ, its prevention activities or the purchase of a new technology (firm ܱ). We suppose that no firm is able, alone, to pay for the total
damage: ܹை ൏ ܪ, ܹூ ൏ ܪ. Each firm is subject to an insolvency constraint. However, we assume that, taken together, both firms have sufficient
wealth to pay for the overall damage 25: ܹை  ܹூ  ܪ. So the relevant
question is how to share  ܪin order to provide both firms with optimal incentives to exercise care and R&D in order to optimally control the level of
risk.
Finally, we assume that strict liability holds. This allows us to simplify
the analysis and thus to focus our attention on finding the optimal sharing
rule. We set aside the issue of fairness in the apportionment, which could
take place with a negligence rule (e.g., by taking into account the relative
degree of negligence of each injurer). Moreover, with regards to damage to
the environment and/or the presence of “high risks,” strict liability tends to
become the default liability rule. 26
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Now we introduce our particular scheme of liability sharing.
B. Apportioning Liability Under Insolvency
Because of individual insolvency constraints (ܹை ൏ ܪǡ ܹூ ൏ )ܪ, there
are constraints on the liability sharing: each agent cannot pay more than its
financial capacity. As a consequence, if we denote as ܦை and ܦூ the
amount in damages to be paid respectively by the operator and the innovator, we have to take into account the following constraints: ܦை ൏ ܪǡ ܦூ ൏
ܪ.
The liability scheme can be illustrated by the following figure.
Figure 1: apportionment under individual insolvencies

05/10/2016 13:13:34

JOHN FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 15–18, 97 (9th ed. 1998)); see also W.P. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS 536–38 (5th ed. 1984).
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The top of the figure highlights damages to be paid by the operator,
with a reading from right to left. Damages to be paid by the innovator are
represented at the bottom, from left to right. For a good understanding of
how this sharing rule works, we consider the following illustration.
Because of the limited liability constraint, the maximum amount in
damages that can be claimed from the innovator is ܹூ . As a consequence,
the minimum amount in damages that will be claimed from the operator is
the complement  ܪെ ܹூ (highlighted by the dotted line on the right). Applying similar reasoning, we can say that the minimum amount in damages
that will be claimed from the innovator is  ܪെ ܹை (dotted line on the left).
Because of individual constraints of limited liability, these two amounts are
incompressible. As a consequence, the amount of debt to be shared is:
 ܪെ ሺ ܪെ ܹூ ሻ െ ሺ ܪെ ܹை ሻ ൌ ܹூ  ܹ െ ܪ
Put differently, when considering the total amount of damages to be
paid, but abstracting from the minimum (and incompressible) amounts in
damages, the “sharing zone” is restricted to ܹூ  ܹ െ ܪ, which corre-

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 120 Side B

05/10/2016 13:13:34

11 JACOB LOVAT FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

668

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

5/4/2016 1:19 PM

[Vol 91:2

sponds to the total wealth over the amount of damage to be remedied. So it
is only to this sharing zone that our sharing rule will apply.
As a consequence, the amounts in damages to be paid by each agent
are:
ܦை ൌ ܦை ሺߠሻ ൌ ܹை െ ߠǤ ሾܹூ  ܹ െ ܪሿ
ܦூ ൌ ܦூ ሺߠሻ ൌ ܹூ െ ሺͳ െ ߠሻǤ ሾܹூ  ܹ െ ܪሿ

05/10/2016 13:13:34

27. In case of joint and several liability it is possible for an agent to be financially unable to pay
for its a priori share of liability. In that case, the remaining damages are passed on to another solvent
agent. In our system of liability, an agent with a low level of solvency will pay for a low share of the
common debt. But there is no “one for one” relationship between the (in)solvency of one agent, and the
remaining debt attributed to the other agent. Technically, a change in ܹூ or inܹை ܹை leads to the definition of a new value of ߠߠǤ There is not necessarily a transfer of “one for one” between the two agents
(as it is the case under joint and several liability).
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With ߠ the share of “sharing zone” which is attributed to the innovator, and ሺͳ െ ߠሻ the share attributed to the operator, ߠ takes values between
0 and 1. It is important to keep in mind that the apportionment only applies
to the sharing zone: hence, ߠ ൌ ͳൗʹ does not mean that each firm pays for
one half of the total damage ܪ, but that they each pay for one half of the
“sharing zone”. Below highlights the originality of our sharing rule with
respect to existing rules of apportionment.
The different rules currently enforced often define the apportionment
relative to the contribution of each agent to the overall damage. In our case,
the magnitude of  ܪis given and is independent from the actions decided by
the agents (recall that the agent can alter the probability of the damage occurring, not its magnitude). So we cannot define a sharing rule based on the
individual relative contributions to the damage. Moreover, ߠ is defined in a
specific manner, taking into account individual insolvency constraints;
these constraints are ex ante explicitly taken into account. This is very different from the current functioning of the liability system where the agents
are a priori liable for a given share of the damage (according to criteria
based on the relative contribution on the damage) but, ex post, they can escape from paying their share of liability thanks to insolvency (what is referred to as “judgment-proofness” in the literature). Here, such a mechanism is excluded: a priori and a posteriori payments are known and
identical. 27
Now that our rule of apportionment is presented, we have to determine
the optimal value of ߠ, so as to provide optimal incentives for prevention
( )ݔand innovation (݁) in order to “properly” control the level of the risk of
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damage. For this, we first have to define the optimal situation, and then to
set ߠ in such a way as to reach this situation.
C. First Best Situation
In economic analyses, it is usually recognized that optimality—or,
equivalently, a “first-best” situation—consists of reaching the maximum
level of social welfare. Social welfare is defined as the sum of all individual welfares. In our case, this corresponds to the sum of the individual profits of the operator and the innovator, minus the level of the risk of damage
borne by third parties. So the definition of optimality responds to the following problem:
ݔܽܯ௫ǡ ܹܵሺݔǡ ݁ሻ ൌ ܹூ  ܹை  ܴூ  ܴை െ ܿ ݔെ ݇݁ െ ሺݔǡ ݁ሻܪ
ሺݔǡ ݁ሻ ൌ

ୣ୶୮ሺିఈ௫ሻାୣ୶୮ሺିఉሻ
ఊ

in our illustration.

We have to find the values of  ݔand ݁ which maximize this social welfare function.
So, optimality comes from a hypothetical situation where all interests
and costs are taken into account by an “omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent dictator,” who aims to maximize the global welfare of society. This
“ideal” situation is used as a benchmark toward which we should strive.
The socially optimal values for  ݔand ݁ (which we respectively denote
 ככ ݔand ݁  ) ככare: 28
ͳ
ߙܪ
݈݊ ൬ ൰
ߙ
ߛܿ

ͳ
ߚܪ
݈݊ ൬ ൰
ߚ
ߛ݇
We verify that the higher the level of damage ܪ, the higher the optimal values of prevention and innovation. The higher the cost ܿ of prevention (respectively, the cost ݇ of innovation), the lower the optimal value of
prevention (respectively, innovation).
݁  ככൌ

ఋௌௐሺ௫ǡሻ
ఋ௫

ൌ Ͳ and

ఋௌௐሺ௫ǡሻ
ఋ

ൌ Ͳ respectively).
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28. These values are derived by using the classical method of finding the first-order conditions
of  ݔand ݁ (i.e. by solving
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At the optimum, the probability of causing an accident should be:
ܿߚ  ߙ݇
ߙߚܪ
The higher the level  ܪof damage, the lower the probability should be.
The higher the cost of making efforts on care and/or in innovation, the lower the social values for prevention and/or innovation and, as a consequence,
the higher the socially optimal value of the probability of an accident occurring.
In reality, of course, no such a dictator exists. Reality involves several
private agents, facing their own constraints and wanting to maximize their
own objectives. The aim of the public regulator is thus to enforce a policy
in such a way as to come as close as possible to the optimal situation, but
taking into account the private behaviors of firms.
To determine the optimal value of the sharing rule ߠ, we have to
properly define all the private interests of both agents,  ܫand ܱ. So we have
to define the market relationship that links them to each other.
ሺ ככ ݔǡ ݁  ככሻ ൌ

D. Two Defendants Linked by a Market Relationship
We know that the operator has the possibility of buying a new production technology from the innovator. More precisely, the relationship between the two agents can be summarized in the following manner.

Step 1: public authority fixes the sharing rule
ߠ  כ, which is common knowledge
Step 2:  ܫdecides on its innovation effort ݁

Step 3: TRANSACTION between  ܫand ܱ:
ܱ buys a new technology, for a price ܻሺ݁ሻ

Step 5: in case of damage, each agent pays
for its share of liability: ܦூ ሺߠ  כሻ and ܦை ሺߠ  כሻ

05/10/2016 13:13:34

Step 4: ܱ decides on its prevention effort ݔ
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Figure 2. Schedule of individual decisions
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These two examples are the two extreme cases that can be encountered on a market. But between them, there is a continuum of intermediate
degrees of competition. As a result, denoting as ߣ the degree of competition
on the R&D market (ߣ ൌ Ͳ means no competition (i.e., a monopoly); ߣ ൌ ͳ
means perfect competition), the price of the new technology is:
ܻሺ݁ሻ ൌ ߣܻ  ሺͳ െ ߣሻܻூ ሺ݁ሻ
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The optimal value of the sharing rule ߠ, which is denoted by ߠ כ, has to
be known before any private decision-making. The two private actors, ܫ
and ܱ, will make their private decisions (in order to maximize their own
profit) in light of the rule ߠ כ.
Moreover, the transaction between the two agents (step 3, figure 2) also has an influence on their decision-making: the selling price of the new
technology alters the incentives of the innovator to design a more or less
reliable technology. The selling price is the result of a bargain between ܫ
and ܱ. The outcome of the bargain depends on the degree of competition
on the R&D market (the market on which the firm  ܫis located). Two extreme cases can be considered:
(i) The R&D market is a perfectly competitive one. In that case, firm ܫ
faces a multitude of competitors, who can also supply firm ܱ. Firm ܫ
has no freedom in fixing its selling price; it has to be in line with the
most efficient competitor (otherwise, it cannot “win the contract”).
Suppose that the selling price offered by the most efficient competitor
is ܻ .
(ii) The R&D market is a monopolistic one. Firm  ܫis the only one to offer
new production technology, and it has the possibility of fixing its own
selling price. The only constraint it faces is firm ܱ having an interest
in buying its new technology. So, firm  ܫwill fix the maximum selling
price, to which firm ܱ is indifferent on whether to buy the new technology or not—the selling price is equal to the benefit firm ܱ can enjoy from using the new technology (in terms of decreasing the probability of an accident occurring and paying ܦை ሺߠ  כሻሻ:
ܻூ ሺ݁ሻ ൌ ܦை ሺߠ  כሻǤ ൫ሺݔǡ Ͳሻ െ ሺݔǡ ݁  כሻ൯
with ሺݔǡ Ͳሻ െ ሺݔǡ ݁  כሻ being the decrease in the probability of an accident when using the new technology (with a degree of technical advancement of ݁  )כinstead of the basic technology (with a degree of
technical advancement of 0).
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This price, which depends on the degree of competition (which determines the relative bargaining power of each firm), reduces the profit of the
operator and increases the profit of the innovator. We remark that in all
cases except perfect competition, price ܻሺ݁ሻ increases with ݁: the higher
the technical advancement of the new technology, the higher its selling
price. 29 So this selling price has an impact on the incentives to provide an
R&D effort. Moreover, the lower the degree of competition on the R&D
market (lower ߣ), the higher the sensitivity of ܻሺ݁ሻ to the level of ݁. Thus,
through the bargaining which takes place between the two firms to fix
ܻሺ݁ሻ, the degree of competition has an impact on the incentives to innovate.
Now that our framework and the social benchmark is outlined, we will
define the optimal sharing rule and discuss the possible policy implications.
IV. RESULTS
In this section, we first present our theoretical results. Then we provide a numerical example in order to illustrate how the sharing rule could
apply.
A. Theoretical Predictions

05/10/2016 13:13:34

29. ܻூ ሺ݁ሻ ൌ ܦை ሺߠ  כሻǤ ൫ሺݔǡ Ͳሻ െ ሺݔǡ ݁  כሻ൯ increases with the level of ݁, because ሺݔǡ ݁ሻ is decreasing in ݁. The higher the degree of technical advancement, the more reliable the new technology
(the lower the probability of causing a damage). So, the expected cost of having to pay ܦை decreases
and this can be valued for the agent ܱ.
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To determine the optimal value of ߠ, i.e. the value which maximizes
social welfare given the fact that each firm pursues its own private interest,
we first have to determine the private decisions made by the firms. To do
so, we use the methodology of backward induction: we determine the last
decision of the schedule (other decisions and parameters being given), and
then roll back the schedule to determine the upstream decisions (the downstream decisions being known and given).
As a first step, we have to determine how the operator chooses its level of effort, ݔ, for a given production technology (with a given degree of
advancement ݁). The operator has to find the value of  ݔwhich maximizes
its private profit:
ݔܽܯ௫ ߨை ሺݔǡ ݁ሻ ൌ  ܹை  ܴை െ ܻሺ݁ሻ െ ܿǤ  ݔെ ሺݔǡ ݁ሻǤ ܦை ሺߠሻ
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ୣ୶୮ሺିఈ௫ሻାୣ୶୮ሺିఉሻ
ఊ
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and ܦை ሺߠሻ ൌ ܹை െ

ߠǤ ሾܹூ  ܹ െ ܪሿ. The value of  ݔwhich maximizes the operator’s private
profit ߨை ሺݔǡ ݁ሻ is:
 כݔൌ

ͳ
ߙܦை ሺߠሻ
݈݊ ቆ
ቇ
ߛܿ
ߙ

We can easily check that:  כ ݔ൏  ככ ݔbecause ܦை ሺߠሻ ൏ ܪ. As a consequence, whatever the sharing rule ߠ, insufficient incentives for care will be
provided. This problem is well known in law and economics, especially
since the work of Shavell. 30 Because of limited liability, the operator does
not take into account the entire damage its activity causes to society. As a
consequence, it does not perceive the whole social benefit of care in terms
of reducing the level of risk of accident. Nevertheless, because ܦை ሺߠሻ decreases in ߠ—recall that ߠ is the portion of the “sharing zone” which is attributed to the innovator (ሺͳ െ ߠ) is attributed to the operator)—the lower
the value of ߠ, the higher the value of  כ ݔ.
In a second step,  כ ݔbeing defined and given, we have to analyze how
the innovator determines its effort ݁  כin terms of innovation. Its effort is determined in such a way as to maximize its private profit:
ݔܽܯ ߨூ ሺݔǡ ݁ሻ ൌ  ܹூ  ܴூ  ܻሺ݁ሻ െ ݇Ǥ ݁ െ ሺ כ ݔǡ ݁ሻǤ ܦூ ሺߠሻ
ୣ୶୮ሺିఈ௫ሻାୣ୶୮ሺିఉሻ
ఊ

, ܦூ ሺߠሻ ൌ ܹூ െ

ሺͳ െ ߠሻǤ ሾܹூ  ܹ െ ܪሿ and ܻሺ݁ሻ ൌ ߣܻ  ሺͳ െ ߣሻൣܦை ሺߠሻǤ ൫ሺ כ ݔǡ Ͳሻ െ
ሺ כ ݔǡ ݁ሻ൯൧.
The value of ݁ which maximizes the operator’s private profit ߨூ ሺݔǡ ݁ሻ
is:
݁ כൌ

05/10/2016 13:13:34

30. See Shavell, supra note 22.

ͳ
ߚሺ ܪെ ߣܦை ሺߠሻሻ
݈݊ ቆ
ቇ
ߚ
ߛ݇

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 123 Side A

with, in our example, ሺݔǡ ݁ሻ ൌ
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Two remarks can be made. First, for a given degree of competition ߣ
different from 0 (i.e., except the case of a monopoly), it is easy to check
that we have ݁  כ൏ ݁ ( ככbecause of ሺ ܪെ ߣܦை ሺߠሻ ൏ )ܪ. We also observe
that the higher ߠ, the higher the effort provided in innovation. The intuition
is very simple: a higher ߠ means a higher degree of liability in case of accident, so the incentives to provide efforts aiming to reduce the likelihood of
damage occurring are strengthened. We can also remark that in a case of a
monopoly (ߣ ൌ Ͳ), the private innovation effort equals the socially optimal
one, whatever the sharing rule ߠ: ݁  כൌ ݁ ככ. The intuition is as follows: in a
case of monopoly, the innovator can fix the maximum selling price,
ܻூ ሺ݁ሻ ൌ ܦை ሺߠሻǤ ൫ሺ כ ݔǡ Ͳሻ െ ሺ כ ݔǡ ݁ሻ൯, which is equal to the (whole) benefit
the innovation provides to the operator in terms of improving the efficiency
of prevention measures, ݔ, to reduce the likelihood of damage occurring.
All these results can be summarized in the following proposition:

ݔܽܯఏ ܹܵሺݔǡ ݁ǡ ߠሻ ൌ ܹூ  ܹை  ܴூ  ܴை െ ܿ כ ݔെ ݇݁  כെ ሺ כ ݔǡ ݁  כሻܪ
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Proposition 1: The Incentives Proposition
Consider two firms, both having an impact on the probability of a
common damage occurring.
I. Sharing liability between the two firms does not lead to an optimal level of effort from the operator (the agent downstream);
II. When there is a strictly positive degree of competition on the
innovation market (where the upstream agent works), sharing
liability does not lead to an optimal level of innovation;
III. The higher the degree of liability for an agent, the higher the
effort it provides; and
IV. In the case of a monopoly on the innovation market, an optimal level of innovation is provided, whatever the apportionment of liability.
We have determined how the private efforts are chosen. Now, with
these elements in mind, we are able to determine the optimal value of ߠ. As
mentioned above, we focus our analysis on the issue of providing optimal
incentives to “properly” control the level of risk. So we need to find the
value of ߠ that maximizes social welfare, taking into account the way in
which the private agents choose their level of effort. So the optimal value
of ߠ responds to the following objective:

05/10/2016 13:13:34
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With:

ሺݔǡ ݁ሻ ൌ

ሺെߙݔሻ  ሺെߚ݁ሻ
ߛ

 כݔൌ

ͳ
ߙܦை ሺߠሻ
݈݊ ቆ
ቇ
ߛܿ
ߙ

݁ כൌ

ͳ
ߚሺ ܪെ ߣܦை ሺߠሻሻ
݈݊ ቆ
ቇ
ߚ
ߛ݇
ܦை ሺߠሻ ൌ ܹை െ ߠǤ ሾܹூ  ܹ െ ܪሿ
We find the following results below.

a.

ఈΤ

ఉൗ


is higher than

ଵ ሺఒିଵሻt
ଷ ଶఒାଵ

b. The level of individual wealth ܹை and ܹூ are sufficiently high. 31
Point (I) of Proposition 2 can easily be deducted from Proposition 1:
because the power of the monopoly allows the innovator to perceive the
whole social benefit from its innovation (so that it receives optimal incentives to invest in R&D), the only problem is the presence of suboptimal incentives for the operator for risk prevention. As a consequence, maximum

05/10/2016 13:13:34

31. For proof of Proposition 2, see the Appendix attached hereto.
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Proposition 2: The Optimal Apportionment Proposition
The optimal apportionment of liability between the two firms depends
on the degree of competition on the R&D market.
I. If the innovator benefits from a monopoly position (ߣ ൌ Ͳ), it
has to assume the minimum share of liability (i.e. ߠ  כൌ Ͳ,
ܦூ ሺߠሻ ൌ  ܪെ ܹை ). A maximum share of liability is assigned
to the operator: ܦை ሺߠሻ ൌ ܹை .
II. For all other degrees of competition (i.e. ߣ ് Ͳ), there is an
optimal apportionment ߠ אሿͲǡͳሾ if the following conditions
are met:
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incentives have to be provided to the operator, via the setting of the maximum degree of liability: ߠ  כൌ Ͳ, so as to obtain ܦை ሺߠሻ ൌ ܹை .
Point (ii) of Proposition 2 teaches us that for an interior solution to exist (i.e. a value of ߠ which is different from 0 and 1), it is necessary for the
efficiency-cost ratio of prevention (i.e. ߙΤܿ ) to be sufficiently higher than
ߚ
that of innovation (i.e. ൗ݇). Given that ߣ takes a value in [0,1], we know
ଵ ሺఒିଵሻt

B. Numerical Illustration
For a given set of parameters, we calculate the private efforts in care
and R&D (and the corresponding level of social welfare), depending on the
sharing rule ߠ. Thereby we deduce the optimal value of ߠ (which induces
the maximum level of social welfare). Then, we seek how the optimal sharing rule varies when the degree of competition on the R&D market changes.
The basic case we study is the following:

05/10/2016 13:13:34

32. If the sum of the two sets of wealth ܹை and ܹூ is just equal to the amount of damage ܪ, the
sharing zone equals 0: each firm is liquidated to pay for the liability, and the amount to be paid in damages is not a decision variable.
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that
takes a value in [0, 1/3]. As a consequence, if the efficiencyଷ ଶఒାଵ
cost ratio of prevention is equal to the efficiency-cost ratio of innovation,
this necessary condition is satisfied. Point (ii) also teaches us that an interior solution requires conditions regarding the firms’ wealth to be satisfied.
The intuition is as follows: first, it is necessary for the wealth to be sufficiently high to exceed the overall damage. The higher the sum of the individual wealth, the higher the “sharing zone” defined in section III.B supra. 32 Second, having an optimal value of ߠ different from 0 and 1 means
that the situation requires “balanced incentives” to be provided; there is no
need to provide maximum incentives to one agent (and minimum incentives to the other one). In other words, the lack of incentives is similar for
the two agents. All else being equal, incentives are provided through the
size of the wealth; the more an agent can lose in case of accident, the higher the incentives to avoid the accident. So, all else being equal, the more
similar the agents’ wealth, the more balanced (between the two agents) the
incentives to be provided.
Finally, it is worth developing a numerical illustration. It allows us to
test for the application of such a policy (within different situations), and also to see how the performance of the regulation evolves when the degree of
competition on the R&D market varies.
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 ܪൌ ͳͶͲͲ

ܴை ൌ ͳͲͲ

ܿൌʹ
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ߙ ൌ Ͳǡͷ

ܹை ൌ ͳ͵ͲͲ ܴூ ൌ ͳͲͲ

݇ ൌ ͳǡͻͺ ߚ ൌ Ͳǡͷͷ

ܹூ ൌ1000

ߣൌͳ

ߛൌʹ
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For that specific case, the optimal apportionment of liability is: ߠ  כൌ
Ͳǡͷ͵. This means that it is optimal to allocate 65.3% of the sharing zone
to the innovator, and 34.7% to the operator.
Given these different elements, the minimum amount in damages the
operator has to pay is:  ܪെ ܹூ ൌ ͳͶͲͲ െ ͳͲͲͲ ൌ ͶͲͲ, the innovator has
to pay:  ܪെ ܹை ൌ ͳͶͲͲ െ ͳ͵ͲͲ ൌ ͳͲͲ, and the sharing zone is: ܹூ 
ܹை െ  ܪൌ ͳͲͲͲ  ͳ͵ͲͲ െ ͳͶͲͲ ൌ ͻͲͲ.
It follows that the optimal amount in damages the operator has to pay
is: 400 + 0.347*900 = 712.3, i.e. 50.88% of the total damage ܪ, and the optimal amount in damages the innovator has to pay is: 100 + 0.653*900 =
687.7, i.e. 49.12% of the total damage ܪ.
We then calculate how the optimal apportionment ߠ  כreacts when the
degree of competition on the R&D market changes.
We find that the lower (respectively higher) the degree of competition
on the R&D market, the lower (respectively higher) the degree of liability
to assign to the innovator. This result is a consequence of Point (I) of Proposition 2: in case of a monopoly on the R&D market, the innovator has optimal incentives to innovate. Starting from this point, a higher degree of
competition on the R&D market prevents the innovator from fixing a high
selling price for its technology and, above all, from making the price dependent on the innovation effort. This leads to lower incentives to innovate,
which have to be compensated by a higher degree of liability for the innovator. This point is illustrated, in our numerical example, by Figure 3 below.
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Figure 3. Optimal sharing rule ࣂ and share of global liability ( )
depending on the degree of competition ࣅ

A higher degree of competition on the R&D market (a higher value of
ߣ, on the x-axis) is associated with a higher value of ߠ ( כthe black solid
line), meaning that the share of liability assigned on the operator decreases

( ೀ , the grey dashed line).
ு
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
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Our analysis aims to propose a rule of apportionment of liability in order to regulate frequent situations in which two actors, with low levels of
solvency, have an impact on the likelihood of a common damage occurring.
Each actor, via its decision, alters the probability of an accident occurring.
Moreover, the two actors are linked by a market relationship, as one actor
provides a production technology to the other (and the reliability of this
technology has an impact on the ability to “properly” control the level of
risk).
The originality of our work is twofold. First, to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study to analyze this kind of situation. Second,
our originality also lies in our adoption of a normative perspective. We do
not propose a comparison between existing rules of apportionment (such as
joint and several liability and non-joint liability), but instead propose a new
rule, regardless of the existing ones, which aims to provide optimal incentives for controlling the risk of damage. Nevertheless, in order to ensure a
potential application, we take into account important practical “constraints,” such as the principle of limitation of liability.
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The rule of apportionment we suggest has no equivalent in practice.
We highlight the fact that the nature of the market relationship which links
the two agents is a key factor in the definition of the optimal sharing rule.
We specifically show that in the case of a monopoly on the R&D market
(upstream agent / provider), a minimum liability has to be assigned to the
innovator since its market power provides sufficient incentives to provide a
“high-quality” technology (via the ability to fix a high selling price). When
a higher degree of competition holds on this market, the optimal apportionment depends on the ratio of efficiency/cost of prevention and R&D,
and on individual relative wealth. Nevertheless, all else being equal, a
higher degree of competition on the R&D market calls for a higher degree
of liability for the innovator.
This result leads to at least two remarks. We show that on a monopolistic R&D market, efficiency calls for a minimum liability for the innovator. This result could be used in combination with the rationale of the patent system, which gives an innovator a monopolistic position, in such a
way as to foster the incentives provided by this system. The importance of
the degree of competition in the definition of the optimal apportionment of
liability leads to another policy implication. Our result suggests that, all
else being equal, a variation in the degree of competition on the R&D market leads to a variation in the optimal apportionment of liability. Thus, having knowledge about the degree of competition on this market is a necessary condition to properly configure the liability system. Our result thus
calls for collaboration between the competition authorities, which have sufficient expertise to assess the degree of competition, and the legislatures
and courts. Here, the fundamental idea is to build a “liability formula”
which gives the amount to be paid for liability by each defendant. This
formula depends on different parameters such as the relative efficiency/cost
ratios (of care and R&D), the amounts of assets, and the overall damage
and the degree of competition on the market. This formula, which should
be common knowledge (in order to provide ex ante incentives), would be
used ex post by the courts to establish liability. The competition authority’s
expertise should be necessary ex ante and ex post. Ex ante, its expertise is
needed to determine this formula (i.e., the way in which competition affects
the incentives). Ex post, in case of damage, its expertise is needed to assess
the degree of competition on the relevant market (thus allowing a calculation of the amounts in damages to be claimed). This necessity for collaboration is also extended to regulation agencies, since the optimal apportionment also depends on characteristics of the production technologies.
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Our analysis, like any exploratory study, is built on simple and strong
assumptions that should be removed in further analyses. Our results have to
be interpreted in the light of these assumptions. Assuming strict liability
allows us to set aside the issues related to fairness in the apportionment of
debt. Such an assumption simplifies the analysis but, from a practical point
of view, could be justified by the fact that strict liability is increasingly
used in environmental damage cases and for controlling highly hazardous
activities—which are the activities we had in mind when developing our
analysis. However, other assumptions should be removed and thus call for
further studies. For instance, we greatly simplify the analysis when we assume that R&D activities always (and rapidly) succeed in improving the
technology. We know that R&D activities are highly uncertain, and the
possible benefits can be earned within a medium/long-term perspective.
Conversely, prevention activities have an impact in the short term, and their
efficiency is less uncertain. Nevertheless, R&D activities have an impact
on the technological trajectory, i.e. on the long-run ability of preventive
measures to reduce the level of risk. So their overall long-run impact may
be higher than the benefit of providing a higher level of prevention, but
with a “less advanced” technology. As a consequence, the trade-off between prevention and R&D calls for a broader analysis of certain shortterm benefits versus more uncertain (but potentially higher) long-run benefits.
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APPENDIX

Proof of Proposition 2
Point (II) can be demonstrated in the following manner:
To lighten the calculations, we directly search for an optimal value of
ܦை , the amount in damages to be paid by the operator. We just have to keep
in mind that ܦை only takes values in ሾ ܪെ ܹூ ǡ ܹை ሿ. Then, with the value of
ௐೀ ିೀ
ܦை , it is easy to find the corresponding value of ߠ: ߠ ൌ
ௐ ାௐ ିு


ೀ

The optimal value of ܦை maximizes social welfare, taking into account the private levels of efforts.
ݔܽܯఏ ܹܵሺݔǡ ݁ǡ ܦை ሻ ൌ ܹூ  ܹை  ܴூ  ܴை െ ܿ כ ݔെ ݇݁  כെ ሺ כ ݔǡ ݁  כሻܪ
With:
ሺെߙݔሻ  ሺെߚ݁ሻ
ߛ
ͳ
ߙܦ
ை
൰
 כ ݔൌ ݈݊ ൬
ߛܿ
ߙ

ሺݔǡ ݁ሻ ൌ

݁ כൌ

ఋௌௐሺ௫ǡǡೀ ሻ
ఋೀ

ൌ Ͳ, is:

ܿܪ
ߣ݇ܪ
ߣ݇
െܿ

െ

ൌͲ
ଶ
ߙܦை ߙሺܦை ሻt ߚሺ ܪെ ߣܦை ሻ
ߚሺ ܪെ ߣܦை ሻ
െሺܦை ሻଷ ߣଶ ሺܿߚ  ݇ߙሻ  ሺܦை ሻଶ ܿߚܪሺʹߣ  ߣଶ ሻ െ ܦை ܿߚ ܪଶ ሺʹߣ  ͳሻ  ܿߚ ܪଷ
֜
ߙߚሺܦை ሻtሺ ܪെ ߣܦை ሻt
ൌͲ
So, the optimal value of ܦை satisfies:
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ሺܦை ሻଷ ߣଶ ሺܿߚ  ݇ߙሻ െ ሺܦை ሻଶ ܿߚܪሺʹߣ  ߣଶ ሻ  ܦை ܿߚ ܪଶ ሺʹߣ  ͳሻ െ ܿߚ ܪଷ
ൌͲ

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 127 Side A

The first order condition,

ͳ
ߚሺ ܪെ ߣܦை ሻ
݈݊ ൬
൰
ߚ
ߛ݇

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 127 Side B

05/10/2016 13:13:34

11 JACOB LOVAT FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

682

5/4/2016 1:19 PM

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 91:2

Dividing by ܿߚ, the condition can be rewritten:
ܨሺܦை ሻ ൌ ሺܦை ሻଷ ߣଶ ሺͳ  ߬ሻ െ ሺܦை ሻଶ ܪሺʹߣ  ߣଶ ሻ  ܦை ܪଶ ሺʹߣ  ͳሻ െ
ఈΤ

ൗ

 ܪଷ ൌ Ͳ,with ߬ ൌ ఉ

This first order condition is a third-degree equation in ܦை , which we
denote ܨሺܦை ሻ.
Differentiating ܨሺܦை ሻ leads to a second-degree polynomial:
ܨԢሺܦை ሻ ൌ ͵ሺܦை ሻଶ ߣଶ ሺͳ  ߬ሻ െ ʹܦை ܪሺʹߣ  ߣଶ ሻ   ܪଶ ሺʹߣ  ͳሻ
whose discriminant is: οൌ Ͷ ܪଶ ሾሺʹߣ  ߣtሻt െ ͵ߣtሺ߬  ͳሻሺʹߣ  ͳሻሿ.
The discriminant ο is of the sign of ሺʹߣ  ߣtሻt െ ͵ߣtሺ߬  ͳሻሺʹߣ  ͳሻ.
ଵ ሺఒିଵሻt

ௐ

ݐை ൌ , i.e. the maximum payment in damages the operator can
ு
bear (its wealth, ܹை ), expressed as a percentage of the overall damage ܪ.
This allows us to rewrite:
 ܦை ൌ ܹை ൌ ݐை ܪ
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We can deduce that for ߬ 
, ܨሺܦை ሻ is always non negative,
ଷ ଶఒାଵ
and so ܨሺܦை ሻ is an increasing function with a unique root. So before ܦை
the function ܹܵ increases, and decreases after ܦை : ܦை is the unique maximize of ܹܵ.
Now we have to take into account the constraints on the value of ܦை .
We know that ܦை takes only values in ሾ ܪെ ܹூ ǡ ܹை ሿ. As a consequence:
If the optimal value of ܦை is lower than  ܪെ ܹூ , this means that a
minimum liability has to be assigned to the operator and we obtain: ܦை ൌ
 ܪെ ܹூ . This situation is not optimal, but because of the limited liability
principle, we can only obtain this “second best” choice.
If the optimal value of ܦை is higher than ܹை , this means that a maximum liability has to be assigned to the operator and we obtain: ܦை ൌ ܹை .
This situation is not optimal, but because of the limited liability principle,
we can only obtain this “second best” choice.
So, we look at the conditions which ensure an interior solution, i.e. an
optimal value of ܦை which lies in ሾ ܪെ ܹூ ǡ ܹை ሿ. For this, let us define:
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ுିௐ

ݐூ ൌ ு  , i.e. the remaining amount of damage (which remains to
be remedied) when a maximum liability is assigned to the innovator ( ܪെ
ܹூ ), expressed as a percentage of the overall damage ܪ. This allows us to
rewrite:
 ܦை ൌ  ܪെ ܹூ ൌ ݐூ ܪ
To obtain ܦை אሿ ܪെ ܹூ ǡ ܹை ሾ requires the following condition to be
satisfied:
ܨሺݐூ ܪሻ  Ͳ  ܨሺݐை ܪሻ
which is equivalent to:
ሺݐை ሻଷ ሺെߣଶ ሻ  ሺݐை ሻଶ ሺߣଶ  ʹߣሻ  ݐை ሺെʹߣ െ ͳሻ  ͳ
߬
ሺݐை ሻଷ ߣt
ሺݐூ ሻଷ ሺെߣଶ ሻ  ሺݐூ ሻଶ ሺߣଶ  ʹߣሻ  ݐூ ሺെʹߣ െ ͳሻ  ͳ

ሺݐூ ሻଷ ߣt

We observe that:
ሺ௧ೀ ሻయ ൫ିఒమ ൯ାሺ௧ೀ ሻమ ൫ఒమ ାଶఒ൯ା௧ೀ ሺିଶఒିଵሻାଵ
ሺ௧ೀ ሻయ ఒt
ሺ௧ ሻయ ൫ିఒమ ൯ାሺ௧ ሻమ ൫ఒమ ାଶఒ൯ା௧ ሺିଶఒିଵሻାଵ
ሺ௧ ሻయ ఒt

is

decreasing

in

ܹை ,

and

is increasing in ܹூ Ǥ So the condition is

more easily satisfied when both ܹை and ܹூ are sufficiently high.
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